guidance

High-risk § 3.8.1

Point 8(a): AI systems intended to be used to assist judicial authorities or in alternative dispute resolution

Official source ↗

(405)

Point 8(a) of Annex III classifies as high-risk AI systems intended to be used by judicial authorities or on their behalf to assist a judicial authority in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts, or to be used in a similar way in alternative dispute resolution. Point 8(a) of Annex III therefore contains two distinct use cases: first, AI systems intended to be used by judicial authorities or on their behalf to assist a judicial authority in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to concrete set of facts; and, second, AI systems intended to be used in alternative dispute resolution (for example intended for arbitration procedures) in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts. First use case: AI systems intended to be used to assist judicial authorities

i. Overview of use cases and horizontal issues

(406)

The first high-risk use case listed in point 8(a) of Annex III concerns AI systems intended to be used by a judicial authority or on its behalf to assist that authority in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts. The classification of such AI systems as high-risk aims to address the risks of potential biases, errors, and opacity when AI assists judicial decision-making. In line with Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, Recital 61 AI Act underlines that ‘the use of AI tools can support the decision-making power of judges or judicial independence, but should not replace it: the final decision-making must remain a human-driven activity’. This reaffirms the essential role of judge s in the administration of justiceand the importance of their ability to decide independently.

(407)

For an AI system to be classified as high-risk under the first use case of point 8(a) of Annex III AI Act, two cumulative conditions must be fulfilled: first, the AI system must be intended to be used by a judicial authority or on its behalf; second, the intended purpose of that system must be to assist the judicial authority in researching and interpreting facts and the law, and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts. These conditions and the concepts necessary to interpret them are analysed in more detail in the subsections below.

(408)

As explained above, for the purposes of the AI Act, judicial authorities acting in criminal matters, or other authorities that exercise judicial functions or constitute part of the judicial system in criminal matters, should be considered as both ‘judicialauthorities’ within the meaning of point 8 of Annex III, as well as ‘law enforcement authorities’ within the meaning of point 6 of that Annex.

ii. Judicial authority

(409)

To fall within this use case, the AI system must be intended to be used by a judicial authority or on its behalf. The AI Act does not contain a definition of ‘judicial authority’. While it follows from Recital 61 AI Act that this use case aims to primarily address AI systems that are intended to be used by judges, the term ‘judicial authority’ is broader and can also cover other authorities that exercise judicial functions or constitute part of the judicial system.

(410)

The scope of the notion of a ‘judicial authority’ may vary between Member States. In many jurisdictions the term refers primarily to courts and judges exercising adjudicatory powers, such as district courts, regional courts, high courts, supreme courts and constitutional courts.Some Member States also have established special tribunals as judicial authorities.

(411)

At the same time, point 8(a) of Annex III is not intended to cover the judicial administration, that is, institutions or bodies that are responsible for the management, governance, and support of the judiciary, rather than for the adjudication of cases the mselves. The notion of judicial authority is also not intended to cover quasi-adjudicative bodies which, despite exercising decision-making functions, cannot be equivalated to judicial authorities. Thus, the notion of ‘judicial authority’ does not encompas s bodies such as data protection authorities or competition authorities acting as administrative bodies. Their decisions, however, remain subject to judicial review by competent courts, in which case the use case listed in point 8(a) of Annex III may be relevant.

(412)

The case law of the CJEU on the notion of ‘judicial authority’may serve as guidance for determining whether the use case in point 8(a) of Annex III applies. According to the CJEU, a judicial authority is a body established by law, independent and empowered to make binding decisions in the administration of justice94; typically (but not necessarily exclusively) referring to courts or tribunals within the judicial system95 and excluding institutions such as notaries96. A body may be classified as such when it is performing judicial functions, but not when exercising other functions, inter alia functions of an administrative nature. When it exercises administrative authority, without at the same time being called on to adjudicate in a specific case , it cannot be regarded as exercising a judicial function.

(413)

For the purposes of Annex III AI Act, public prosecutors should generally be considered to fall within the use case for law enforcement authorities in point 6 of Annex III, since those use cases expressly include bodies responsible for the prosecution of criminal offences97. Whether they may also qualify as a ‘judicial authority’ for the purposes of point 8(a) of Annex III will depend on their institutional independence as provided for in the applicable law and the purpose for which the AI system is intended to be used by them. As regards their institutional independence, the CJEU’s case-law on the role of public prosecutors in relation to Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (‘the European Arrest Warrant’) may serve as inspiration. The importance of such independence is 98 highlighted in Article 5(3) and (6) AI Act, which require that judicial authorities act independently in the context of granting prior authorisation for the use of ‘realtime’ RBI systems in publicly-accessible spaces99.

iii. On behalf of a judicial authority

(414)

The considerations set out in Section 2.5 above regarding the interpretation of the terms ‘on behalf of’used in several use cases listed in Annex III are relevant for the first use case listed in of point 8(a) of Annex III. Consequently, AI systems ‘intended to be used by a judicial authority or on their behalf’ should cover AI systems that are intended both for the use of judicial authorities themselves, as well as by other entities in scenarios where a judicial authority may outsource certain of its activities to a third party. If a judicial authority requests a third party (i.e. appoints or commissions a third party to perform an analysis under the authority, instruction or delegation of a judicial authority) to perform an analysis of case materia ..l, and that third party uses an AI system for the purpose of that analysis, such use should be seen as the use of that AI system on behalf of the requesting judicial authority.

(415)

Court appointed experts (such as technical experts, forensic experts, psychologists, social services) may in some cases be considered, for the purposes of the AI Act, as acting ‘on behalf of a judicial authority’ when they prepare reports requested by a judicial authorityand these reports are intended to assists the judicial authority in the exercise of their adjudicative functions . In this regard the notion of acting ‘on behalf of a judicial authority” should be limited to situations where the expert or third party is appointed, commissioned, instructed or delegated by the judicial authority to perform a specific task on its instructions and under its responsibility. Th e decisive element is not merely that the expert’s report may be used in the proceedings, but that the task is carried out within the mandate given by the court and subject to its procedural control. Party-appointed experts should not fall within this notion, since they are instructed by a party rather than by the court.

(416)

AI systems intended to be used by parties and their legal representatives, do not fall within the scope of point 8(a) of Annex III, as parties and their representatives are not acting ‘on behalf of a judicial authority’. Therefore, AI systems intended to be used by attorneys to facilitate the submission of procedural documents to a judicial authority do not fall within the use case listed in point 8(a) of Annex III. iv. ‘Intended to be used to assist a judicial authority in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts’

(417)

Only AI systems that are intended to be used to assist a judicial authority in the performance of judicial tasks will fall within the use case listed in point 8(a) of Annex III . That assistance must consist of assisting a judicial authority (i) in researching and interpreting the facts and the law, or

(ii)

in applying the law to a concrete set of facts, or (iii) in both. This means that the intended purpose of the AI system must be to assist a judicial authority in either or both of these tasks.

(418)

It is not required that an AI system necessarily assists both ‘in researching and interpreting facts and the law’ and ‘in applying the law to a concrete set of facts’ ; these conditions are alternative . Both are distinct types of legal activities and the assistance of an AI system in either activity would lead to that AI system performing a function with a high significance for individual decisions. It is sufficient for the AI system to be intended to assist in either activity for it to classify as high-risk. The circumstances of use by the judicial authority are not decisive for high-risk classification. Moreover, the use case does not require that the AI system must be intended to actually perform the aforementioned tasks, but only to ‘assist a judicial authority’ in the performance of those tasks. This means that the AI system needs to assist the judicial authority in a manner that is relevant for its judicial decision-making. For example, an AI system could be considered to assist in applying the law to a concrete set of facts without recommending a judicial decision.

(419)

The requirement of ‘assistance” would not be fulfilled where the task lacks a sufficiently direct functional link to judicial reasoning or decision-making. Recital 61 AI Act explains that the classification of AI systems as high-risk should not extend to AI systems intended for purely ancillary administrative activities that do not affect the actual administration of justice in individual cases, such as anonymisation or pseudonymisation of judicial decisions, documents or data, communication between personnel and administrative tasks. In other words, the recital draws a distinction between AI systems that affect the exercise of judicial functions and those that merely perform administrative tasks. The latter category of systems are not intended to ‘assist’ a judicial authority in a way that is relevant for the high-risk classification.

(420)

Even if an AI system could be considered to ‘assist’ a judicial authority to a degree that makes it eligible for the high-risk classification, providers may apply the filter mechanism in Article 6(3)AI Act if any of the conditions for such filtering are fulfilled, unless the AI system performs profiling. v. ‘Researching and interpreting the facts and the law’

(421)

The concept of ‘researching and interpreting the facts and the law’ refers to the activity carried out by a judicial authority in the course of adjudication.It encompasses the examination and assessment of factual circumstances and the identification and interpretation of relevant legal provisions and jurisprudence. As such, it does not cover the mere retrieval of information. Thus, AI systems intended to be used as advanced search tools are, in general, not covered by point 8(a) of Annex III AI Act . Syste ms that merely organise documents, retrieve legal acts or case law, or perform keyword-based searches serve an auxiliary informational function. They facilitate access to legal sources, but do not themselves engage in legal reasoning or interpretation.

(422)

However, beyond retrieval, an AI system may also assign a meaning, resolve an ambiguity, or draw legal conclusions from the retrieved sources (e.g. suggesting relevant precedents on the basis of presented facts of a case; identifying the relevant legal aspects and summarising the text; providing a legal reasoning that it infers from multiple sources).Such an AI system assists in researching and interpreting the facts and the law and thus is likely to be classified as high-risk pursuant to point 8(a) of Annex III. vi. ‘Applying the law to a concrete set of facts’

(423)

The concept of ‘applying the law to a concrete set of facts” refers to the core activity carried out by a judicial authority in the course of adjudication. It encompasses the subsumption of the presented facts under the applicable law and thus combines the assessment of the factual circumstances and the interpretation of relevant legal provisions and jurisprudence. This is to be understood broadly, meaning that this use case should be considered tocover both situations where the AI system assists in the full judicial assessment of a case, as well as in the assessment of its constituent elements.

a) Practical examples of AI systems falling within the use case of point 8(a)

Judicial decision/judgment drafting systems

b) Practical examples of AI systems falling outside the use case of point 8(a)

Speech-to-text systems

(i)

it can take various audio file formats (or live audio) and produce textual transcripts, including automated speaker separation (distinguishing different voices) and insertion of punctuation;(ii)it can correct terminology – for example, recognising legal terms or names and adjusting the vocabulary accordingly. While the transcription of court hearings that become part of the file could be considered to assist a judicial authority to access testimonies of witnesses and parties to a proceeding, such a tool does not assist in researching and interpreting facts and the law100. The fact that recordings or transcripts generated by an AI system may later form part of the evidentiary record in judicial proceedings, and that inaccuracies may affect fundamental rights, does not in itself mean that the system is intended to assist a judicial authority in researching and interpreting facts and the law within the meaning of point 8(a) of Annex III. In this case, the system’s intended purpose is limited to technical recording or transcription without analytical or evaluative functionalities. The same would remain true if such an AI system is later used as technical assistance in information retrieval to help interrogate the court transcript (e.g., requesting to search ‘when was topic X discussed” in order to find the location in the original audio file). That conclusion could be different where voice-to-text transcripts are further processed by an AI system to summarise or select the key arguments or produce further evaluations of relevance for the judicial decision-making, including when resulting in recommendations to judges. AI systems facilitating communication with the public

c) Practical examples of AI systems falling within the use case but exempted by the filter mechanism in Article 6(3) AI Act

AI systems assisting in pre-classification of incoming applications or claims

i. Overview of use cases and horizontal issues

(424)

The second high-risk use case listed in point 8(a) of Annex III concerns AI systems that are intended to be used by alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) bodies in a similar way to AI systems that are intended to be used to assist a judicial authority in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts. The classification of such AI systems as high-risk also aims to address the risks of potential biases, errors and opacity. The purpose of such classification is to ensure the same level of protection in the context of dispute resolution, regardless of whether an AI system is intended to assist such adjudication with legally binding effects within or outside the area of ordinary courts with constitutionally established adjudicative functions.

(425)

For an AI system to be classified as high-risk under the second use case listed in point 8(a) of Annex III two conditions must be fulfilled: first, that system must be intended to be used by an ADR body where the outcome of the ADR proceedings produces legal effects for the parties; and, second, the intended purpose of the system must be to assist the ADR body in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts.

ii. The concept of alternative dispute resolution

(426)

ADR means adjudicating a dispute out of court with the assistance of an impartial ADR body. Examples of ADR include arbitration, mediation, conciliation, ombudsmen and complaints boards101. Inspiration for interpreting the concept of ADR may be found in Union legislation, such as Directive 2013/11/EU (the ADR Directive), as amended by the Directive 2025/2647, which regulates consumer ADR.

iii. Alternative dispute resolution body

(427)

Point (8)(a) of Annex III refers to AI systems used in ADR ‘in similar ways’, which should be understood as meaning that the system is used for the same purposes as when it used by judicial authorities. Recital 61 AI Act clarifies that that should be understood as meaning that the system should be used by ADR bodies.

(428)

The AI Act does not define which entities constitutes ADR bodies. For the ADR used in consumer disputes, inspiration may be found in Article 4(1)(h) of the ADR Directive102 , which defines an ADR entity as any entity, however named or referred to, which is established on a durable basis and offers the resolution of a dispute through an ADR procedure and that is listed103 in accordance with Article 20(2) of that Directive.

(429)

Beyond consumer protection, ADR bodies should be considered to include a wide set of entities that deal with civil, including commercial and labour, and other disputes. Such entities mayinclude:

  • Commercial arbitration institutions (e.g. national and international arbitration bodies) or investment dispute bodies that resolve disputes between businesses;
  • Mediation centres for civil and commercial matters, established under the EU Mediation Directive (2008/52/EC)104;
  • Labour dispute resolution bodies, such as conciliation or mediation services in employment law;
  • Equality bodies that offer alternative dispute resolution solutions in discrimination matters105;
  • Professional disciplinary or regulatory bodies (e.g. in healthcare, legal professions, or engineering), which often operate ADR mechanisms to address disputes or complaints within professional practice.

iv. Producing legal effects for the parties

(430)

While the wording of point 8(a) of Annex III is terse, Recital 61 AI Act clarifies that AI systems intended to be used by ADR bodies should be classified as high-risk where the outcome of the ADR proceedings produce legal effects for the parties. Accordingly, where the outcome of an ADR procedure is a voluntary agreement or non-binding recommendation, an AI system intended to be use in such a procedure will not fall within the use case listed in point 8(a) of Annex III, since the procedure do not produce legal effects for the parties.

(431)

Whether ADR proceedings produce legal effects for the parties depends on the national law of the Member States. This should be verified on a case-by-case basis. For instance, arbitral awards generally have binding and final effect on the parties, similar to a court judgment. They are enforceable under national law and international ly recognised through the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958)106. By contrast, i n case of mediation and conciliation, the outcome is usually a voluntary agreement, which does not generally have binding legal force, but Directive 2008/52/EC (‘the EU Mediation Directive’) allows parties to stipulate that their agreement is made enforceable by a court or competent authority, giving it the same effect as a judgment.

(432)

When it comes to consumer disputes, the ADR Directive explicitly acknowledges the ADR schemes that propose a solution (which the parties are free to accept), impose a solution (which can be binding upon parties, or even only binding upon trader), or bring the parties together with the aim of facilitating an amicable solution. In practice, the same ADR body may deliver more than one type of outcome, for example, depending on the parties’ wishes. For the ADR proceedings to produce legal effect s, it will suffi ce that the binding nature applies to either party (i.e. only the trader).

(433)

The 2025 amendments to the ADR Directive have introduced additional safeguards for the use of automated decision-making in the decision-making process (actions which influence decisions on whether to deal with the dispute and decisions concerning the outcome of the dispute, and as excluding purely ad ministrative or technical tasks). Namely, the parties shall be informed that automated means are used and have a right to request a human review of the outcome. These additional safeguards apply in parallel with the AI Act and are not limited to AI systems, covering also technologies falling outside the scope of the AI Act.

(434)

Where the outcome of an ADR proceeding produces legal effects for the parties, an AI system whose intended purpose is to assist the ADR body in researching and interpreting facts and the law, or in applying the law to a concrete set of facts , shall be classified as high-risk pursuant to point 8(a) of Annex III. Practical examples of AI systems falling within the scope of this use case can be derived from the examples provided for AI systems intended to be used by judicial authorities above.

  1. Case C-64/16,Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses EU:C:2018:117, para 38: ‘In that regard, the Court notes that the factors to be taken into account in assessing whether a body is a ‘court or tribunal’ include, inter alia, whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent. ’
  2. Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU,OG and PI,EU:C:2019:456, paras 50-51: ‘In the first place, in that regard, it should be noted that the Court has previously held that the words ‘judicial authority’, contained in that provision, are not limited to designating only the judges or courts of Member State, but must be construed as designating, more broadly, the authorities participating in the administration of criminal justice in that Member State, as distinct from, inter alia, ministries or police services which are part of the executive (…). It follows that the concept of a ‘judic ial authority’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, is capable of including authorities of a Member State which, although not necessarily judges or courts, participate in the administration of criminal justice in that Member State.’
  3. Such CJEUposition was reached in the context of the EU Succession Regulation. See Case C-80/19 E.E. ECLI:EU:C:2020:569, para 54, where it was noted that notaries do not have the competence to adjudicate on the issues in dispute between the parties. In another caseCJEU stated that an authority must be regarded as exercising judicial functions where it may have jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes in matters of succession. That criterion applies irrespective of whether the proceedings for issuing a deed of ce rtification of succession are contentious or non-contentious (judgment of 23 May 2019, WB, C‑658/17, EU:C:2019:444, paragraph 56).
  4. Article 3(45) of the AI Act.
  5. See, e.g. Case C-509/18 PF, Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU OG and PI, Case C-489/19 NJ, Joined Cases C-566/19 PPU and C-626/19 PPU JR and YC and Case C-414/20 PPU MM. In particular, Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU OG and PI EU:C:2019:456, par as 88–89: ‘It follows from the foregoing that, in so far as the public prosecutors’ offices at issue in the main proceedings are exposed to the risk of being influenced by the executive in their decision to issue a European arrest warrant, those public prosecutors’ o ffices do not appear to meet one of the requirements of being regarded as an ‘issuing judicial authority’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, namely the requirement that it be guaranteed that they act independently in issuing such an arrest warrant.In the present case, it is, in that regard, irrelevant, for the reasons stated in paragraph 73 of the present judgment, that, in connection with the issuing of the European arrest warrants at issue in the main proceedings, no instruction in a specific casewas issued to the public prosecutor’s office in Lübeck or in Zwickau from the ministers for justice of the Länder concerned.’
  6. Paragraphs 392 & 394,Commission Guidelines on prohibited AI practices established by Regulation (EU) 2024/1689.
  7. If such system is merely a voice-to-text AI system, it could alsobe deemed as an ancillary and administrative task that should not be seen as falling under high-risk use case under point 8(a) of Annex III, in line with Recital 61. Such applications fulfil a largely clerical and technical task that does not directly affect administration of justice in individual cases. Such systems facilitate record-keeping and documentation, but do not assist in judicial decision-making. Thus, they should not be equated with those AI systems that assist in assessing evidence, determining risk or drafting the reasoning of the decisions.
  8. For ADR in consumer disputes, see Alternative dispute resolution for consumers-European Commission.
  9. Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR). OJ L 165, 18.6.2013, pp. 63–79.
  10. https://consumer-redress.ec.europa.eu/dispute-resolution-bodies_en
  11. Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters. OJ L 136, 24.5.2008, pp. 3–8.
  12. CouncilDirective (EU) 2024/1499 of 7 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and amending Directives 2000/43/EC and 2004/113/EC, OJ L, 2024/1499,29.5.2024; Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and amending Directives 2006/54/EC and 2010/41/EU, OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024.
  13. https://www.newyorkconvention.org/english.